We investigate the consistency and stability of individual risk preferences by slightly manipulating the cognitive resources of subjects through sleepiness. Participants are recruited and randomly assigned to an experiment session at a preferred time of day relative to their diurnal preference (circadian matched) or at a non-preferred time of day (circadian mismatched). For the decision task, subjects and are asked to choose how much to allocate between two state-dependent assets (using the Choi et al., 2010, design). We have two main findings. First, the consistency of behavior for circadian matched and mismatched subjects is statistically the same. This is true whether it is (nonparametrically) defined as consistency with GARP, expected utility, disappointment aversion or cumulative prospect theory. Second, while our cognitive resource (i.e., sleepiness) manipulation yields no difference in consistency of behavior, it results in an increased tendency to take risk. Our experiment confirms theoretical predictions that preferences are consistent yet state-dependent.
Introduction
There is growing evidence that individual risk attitudes, as measured by economic experiments, vary across people and circumstances. These include life-cycle changes (Harbaugh), traumatic personal or family experiences (de Voors et al, Malmendier and Segal, Cullen and Sprenger) , physical conditions (menstrual cycle, testosterone, 4D2D, total sleep deprivation), priming and framing (Benjamin et al.) , cognitive ability (Dohmen et al., 2010;  Rustichini; Benjamin), the different way in which some may bracket choices (Read, et al, 1999) and by ones' genetic makeup (Cesarini et al.) .
In this paper, we examine if temporary challenges to cognitive functioning yield choices that are consistent with rationality or whether differences in decisions are due to lapses in rational behavior broadly defined. In particular, we investigate whether a sleepiness manipulation through circadian mismatch, which is shown to be associated with impairment of cognitive abilities (Bodenhausen, 1990; Kruglanski and Pierro, 2008; Dickinson and McElroy, 2012) , produces changes in preferences while maintaining consistency of behavior. A common assumption in standard economic models (Arrow-Debreu state-dependent preferences model), as well as behavioral models (Tversky, Kahneman and Fox, Koszegi and Rabin, models of addiction…), is that changes in preferences can occur without the loss of rationality. Our experimental design provides empirical evidence to investigate this assumption.
Circadian timing of decisions is a natural environment to test the stability and consistency of preferences. First, sleepiness has been widely studied in the sciences, and its effects on performance in many domains are well documented and understood.
1 Second, it is a physical condition commonly experienced by most people at some, or many, period(s) of their lives. Because of this, circadian mismatch, compared to other ways to temporarily deplete cognitive resources, is a manipulation that is less likely to generate inconsistencies in behavior due to learning or adaptation to the circadian mismatch. This is important because such learning would confound an examination of preference consistency across states. Third, results
from this type of environment should be relevant to policy. Understanding whether risky choice decisions when sleepy are rational or not and if preferences change could help inform the design of institutions and policies.
Our research protocol is designed to minimize issues of selection and allow interpretation of our results as due to temporary cognitive resource depletion. We start by collecting survey information, which includes a validated measure of one's diurnal preference, on a large number of participants. The data are then used to identify two classic diurnal preference groups: those who are naturally most alert in the morning and those who are naturally most alert in the evening. These morning types and evening types were then randomly assigned to one of two session times: early morning or late night. This produced two treatments, participants who were "matched" in terms of their circadian rhythm (e.g. morning type in a morning session and evening type in an evening session) and circadian "mismatched"
(e.g. morning type in an evening session and evening type in a morning session). Participants assigned to one session time were not allowed to switch to the other. Compliance with session assignment was voluntary, and importantly, we find no significant differences in compliance across treatment conditions. Participants were allowed to take all the time they needed to make their decisions, and this was done to allow participants the opportunity to express their preferences unconstrained by time.
Our results show a significant treatment effect on risk decisions, and this is not due to selection or compliance across treatments. Circadian mismatched participants took significantly longer to complete their decision task, and the time devoted to each individual decision had a larger variance. Also, the choices made in the risky task vary across treatments. We find that mismatched individuals have higher certainty equivalents for different risky asset bundles, indicating they are less risk-averse.
While the manipulation clearly worked and affected preferences, it did not alter the likelihood a subject behaved rationally. Adherence to the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) is identical between mismatched and matched participants. Similarly, deviations from expected utility theory (EU) or more general models of non-expected utility (NEU) behavior are also statistically similar across groups. All of this suggests that preferences can be altered without altering adherence to rational behavior however defined. Consistency with rationality is robust.
Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that a slight manipulation of physical conditions, to produce a temporary challenge to cognition, produces changes in risk attitudes without producing a breakdown of rationality. Our results contrast with those of Dohmen et al. (2010) , Burks et al (2009), and Frederick (2005) , who show that higher levels of permanent cognitive ability are correlated with increased propensity to take risk. Our results show that our manipulation leads to higher certainty equivalents for subjects, which indicates an increased preference for monetary risk. Our experiment was not designed to identify the mechanism causing these effects, however, our results do show that the relationship between alertness and preferences is causal.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to show that changes in preferences can occur without loss of rationality. The closest paper to ours is that of xxxxx, who show that alcohol intake does not impair rational decision-making. Our study differs in that we show that preferences can change while rationality is maintained. In contrast to their study, ours is a more statistically powerful design that includes more choices per subject. Also, in our design, participants were randomly assigned to treatments (circadian mismatched or matched), and this reduces the possibility that participants self-select into the experiment based on certain characteristics (e.g. rationality). To evaluate our hypotheses, we derive a new test of rational behavior that allows examination of differences in behavior within the same population, not across population. All our conclusions are testable using this simple instrument applied to the same population.
In the next section, we describe the experimental design and the cognitive resource manipulation. We then turn to results, first by confirming that our manipulation worked, then examining rationality and choice behavior in the risk task. Finally, we conclude.
Experimental Design

The Risky Choice Experiment Environment
We follow the design of Choi et al (2007) for the risky choice task, which generates a rich set of individual-level data. 2 In each decision round, subjects are asked to allocate tokens between two different accounts: X and Y. Tokens in account X only generate a payoff for the subject if account X is randomly chosen by the computer at the end of that decision round.
Similarly, tokens in account Y only pay if account Y is randomly selected. We implement the "symmetric" treatment design of Choi et al (2007) with a common knowledge 50% probability that either account X or Y will be chosen. Figure 1 shows a sample stimulus where the subject makes an allocation choice on a computer interface by using a mouse-driven pointer to drag point C along the line AB to their desired choice location (including the endpoint locations, if desired). An allocation such as point A or point B is a risky choice with all tokens placed in one account. Thus, the subject would only receive a payoff if the computer randomly selects the account where all the tokens are allocated. An intermediate allocation of tokens, such as point C in Figure 1 , places some tokens in each account, which guarantees the subject a smaller, but sure, payoff in both states of the world.
The experiment consists of 50 decision rounds (i.e., 50 different stimuli) where the slope and intercept of the AB line are randomly determined for each stimulus. 3 After all 50 rounds, one round is randomly selected for payment, and each round has an equal probability of being chosen. The randomly selected payoff-round, the computer's random selection of account X or Y, and the subject's allocation decision for that round determines the subject's payoffs.
The Cognitive Resource Manipulation
We use a circadian match/mismatch protocol to represent a temporary challenge to cognitive resources. While there may be other ways to temporarily deplete resources, our method has broad applicability to circumstances encountered in daily life, has been previously used and validated in the literature, and is relatively easy to administer.
Previous research has shown that single-vehicle accidents increase at times of the day where the typical circadian rhythm dictates sleepiness due to natural release of melatonin (Coren, 1996) . In controlled experiment settings, researchers have found that sleep deprived individuals are less risk averse (i.e., they take on more risk) than well-rested individuals when choosing between risky lotteries (McKenna et al., 2007) . In a different risky choice task, Venkatraman et al, (2007) found neural effects in sleep-deprived subjects even in the absence of behavioral effects. Though sleep loss and circadian timing may both contribute to depleted cognitive resources with symptomatic sleepiness, a 24-hour total sleep deprivation protocol likely depletes cognitive resources to a greater extent than what individuals commonly experience on a daily basis and may therefore not be applicable to a large segment of the population. Decision-making at sub-optimal times of the day is more externally valid, and hence motivates our choice of the circadian mismatch protocol.
Explicit circadian mismatch protocols like we propose have been used in behavioral research to some extent, but this area is relatively unexplored. Bodenhausen (1990) showed that individuals are more likely to use stereotypes in making judgments when at circadian mismatched times, and Kruglanski and Pierro (2008) reported an increased use of the psychological transference effect among subjects tested at circadian mismatched times. Dickinson and McElroy (2010, in press ) used two distinct protocols to manipulate the circadian timing of decision in guessing games, and find that choices made at circadian mismatched times generally produce outcomes farther from the predicted Nash equilibrium. Though limited, the extant literature on circadian mismatch effects is consistent with the hypothesis that circadian mismatch alters decision-making in a way consistent with cognitive resource depletion.
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To implement the circadian mismatch protocol for our current study, we first administer a large-scale online survey at two academic institutions. The objective of the survey is to generate a database of individuals for whom we have a validated measure of their diurnal preference, which is assessed in the survey using the short form of the morningnesseveningness questionnaire, henceforth rMEQ (Adan and Almiral, 1991) . The rMEQ classifies individuals on a scale of 4-25, with morning-types having rMEQ score from 18-25 and evening-types having rMEQ score from 4-11. While this diurnal preference measure is based on selfreports of the subjects, it has been validated against physiological data on oral temperatures (see Horne and Östberg, 1976) and is a standard tool in circadian research.
From our database, we recruit morning-types and evening-types, who we had randomly assigned, ex ante, to participate in either a morning (7:30 a.m.) or an evening (10:00 p.m.) experiment session. This resulted in approximately half of our sample being circadian matched (mismatched) for the risky choice experiment. 5 If a subject could not participate in the randomly assigned time-slot (morning or evening), the subject was not allowed the option of the alternative time-slot-an alternative time-slot was not even mentioned in recruitment.
This aspect of our design eliminates selection into treatments and allows for a more causal interpretation of cognitive resource depletion on outcomes. Importantly, we find no evidence of selection in show-up rates across the matched and mismatched subjects. The proportion of subjects who actually showed up for the session they signed up for is not significantly different across our matched and mismatched subjects (the p-value of a Chi-square test of difference in distribution is 0.495).
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We recruited a total of 112 subjects for this study. Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample across experiment locations for each design cell. The experiment sessions lasted just over an hour, and included the risky choice task administration as well as a few short survey instruments to elicit self-reported measures of recent sleep habits. Average subject payoffs were about $23, which includes a $5 show up fee.
Results
Summary Statistics and Manipulation Check
5 Due to the rarity of true morning-type subjects-less than 10% in young adult populations are morning-types (see Chelminski et al, 2000) -we extend our rMEQ cutoff to include rMEQ scores of 16 and 17. To compensate, we only recruit the more extreme (and still abundant) evening-type subjects with rMEQ scores from 4-9. In this way, our sample is still drawn from the tails of the rMEQ distribution and eliminates the same amount of support from the non-tail portion of the rMEQ distribution compared to if we had used the traditional morning-type cutoff (rMEQ=18) but included non-extreme evening types (rMEQ=10-11) in our sample. 6 Seventy-two matched subjects signed up for experimental sessions, and 60 showed up. Sixty-six mismatched subjects signed up for experimental sessions, and 52 showed up. Table 2 shows relevant summary statistics of our sample. Pre-experiment survey data refers to responses from the online sleep survey administered as a way of building our database of morning-type and evening-type subjects. Pre-experiment survey responses would have been given several days to several weeks before the decisions experiments. Table 2 includes summary statistics for the same questions asked in the pre-experiment survey and after subjects had completed the risky choice task but before payments were revealed. These include self-reports of the subjects' average nightly sleep over the 7-days prior to the response, average sleep the night prior to the response, one's subjective optimal hours of nightly sleep required for peak performance, and the Epworth Sleepiness scale used commonly in sleep research (a measure of trait-level sleepiness, or chronic fatigue). As can be seen, there are no significant differences in any of these descriptive measures between the circadian matched and mismatched subjects.
Because our objective is to introduce a randomized assignment of cognitive resource availability, we present evidence that our circadian manipulation was successful. The manipulation checks in Table 2 reveal that circadian mismatched subjects, who presumably have depleted cognitive resources, report significantly higher state-level sleepiness, significantly longer decision response times, and significantly higher standard deviation of decision response times. These are all consistent with what we expect from a random assignment of a "sleepiness" manipulation. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics related to the menus of relative asset prices faced by circadian matched and mismatched subjects. These statistics confirm that, on average, circadian matched and mismatched subjects faced similar menus-average intercepts of randomly generated budget lines in Fig. 1 do not significantly differ in mean or variance across groups.
Consistency of Behavior
We look first at rationality and then choices in the risk task. We test for consistency of choices with rationality for matched and mismatched subjects using three measures of rational behavior. Specifically, we test if subjects satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP, Afriat 1972 , Varian 1983 , expected utility theory (Varian 1988) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) and Disappointment aversion (Gul 1992) . Table 4 presents the distribution of the Critical Cost to Efficiency Index (Afriat 1972 ).
This index measures how much budget constraints would need to be adjusted to eliminate all violations of GARP. The table shows that 12 percent of matched and mismatched subjects satisfied GARP without having to modify any budget (CCEI = 1). An additional 30 percent of the matched subjects and 24 percent of the mismatched subjects require a small change in the budgets to satisfy GARP. All told, 80 percent of the matched subjects and 78 percent of the mismatch subjects have indices above 0.9. Indeed, the distribution of the CCEI is not significantly different between these two groups. Slight cognitive resource depletion does not cause an increase in the distant to rationality, as measured by the CCEI, of these two groups.
RESULT 1: Cognitive resource depletion via circadian mismatch does not affect choice consistency
Turning now to other measures of rationality, in the context of asset markets, Varian (1988) has derived necessary and sufficient conditions to determine if a set of choices can be rationalized by expected utility theory. The test is based on the fact that expected utility theory weighs utility across states of nature linearly in the probabilities. This means that, in the context of assets markets, expected utility reduces to testing linear separability of utility on statecontingent goods. The Appendix reproduces Varian's (1988) conditions for the specific case of our experiment. Choi et al. (2007) present evidence in favor of rational behavior, but in contradiction with expected utility theory. While they do not perform the expected utility test we present in this paper, the patterns of behavior in their experiment are not consistent with expected utility theory. In particular, they find that subjects choose a safe distribution of assets too frequently (i.e. when relative prices are not equal to one).
Rationality can also be measured with respect to disappointment aversion theory. In the context of our experiment, disappointment aversion reduces to the existence of a kink in the indifference curves around the 45-degree line. This is equivalent to a subject evaluating lotteries below the 45-degree line with one expected utility function and lotteries above the 45-degree line with a different expected utility function. Expected utility is otherwise satisfied. This dual-utility representation of preferences also emerges in the case of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). In the case of CPT, however, probabilities are distorted. In the Appendix, we show how Varian's (1988) test can be modified for disappointment aversion or CPT. Our data do not permit us to distinguish between these two theories because probabilities are the same in all our treatments.
Tests of these theories of consistency of behavior in asset markets reduce to examining whether a subject's choices satisfy a set of linear inequalities. To evaluate how large these slack values are, we calculate the average value that the slack variable would have taken had subjects chosen at random. In a sample of 10,000 randomly generated choices over 50 budgets, we find that the average (s.d.) of the slack variable associated with the expected utility test is 0.322 (0.059). Thus, subjects in our experiment are closer to expected utility than to random choice. However, we find that, according to Fleissig and Whitney's (2005) test, even if subjects are allowed a 10 percent measurement error rate in their choices only half of the subjects would satisfy expected utility theory. Importantly, as in the case of the GARP test, we find no statistical difference in deviations from expected utility theory of matched and mismatched subjects (p-value = 0.658).
Both groups are equally close (far) from expected utility theory.
Failure to find differences in consistency of behavior might be due to the inability of these theories to completely characterize subjects' behavior. The last two rows in Table 5 present the estimated value of the probability weight, 0.5), for the test of cumulative prospect theory. This estimate can be also be used to estimate parameter 1 for disappointment aversion. The table shows that these alternatives to expected utility theory do not improve upon it. The implicit probability weight is very close to 0.5.
Also, the proportion of subjects for whom 0.5 is not different across groups.
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In summary, we find that distant to rational behavior across circadian matched and mismatched subjects is similar regardless of the test of rational behavior we conduct. We now examine if consistency in behavior, whether cognitively challenged or not, also implies that choices in the risk task are the same.
Choices in the Risk Task
In light of the absence of a discernible difference in consistency of behavior, in this section, we investigate whether the circadian mismatch manipulation affects risky choices. We look at the distribution of asset investments, from which we calculate certainty equivalents for subjects. These certainty equivalents constitute a valid measure of risk preference.
Deviations from expected utility theory might manifest through nonlinear responses to prices. In particular, subjects might choose a distribution of assets that favors constant payoffs.
Small variations in relative prices will have a different impact on asset allocations than large changes in relative prices.
Figures 2a and 2b shows kernel estimates of the density function for the share of assets in x for different values of the relative asset price ratio for matched (2a) and mismatched subjects (2b). These density estimates use all the individual data and do not correct for repeated observations for a given subjects. Nevertheless, a pattern of behavior emerges from these figures. Matched subjects tend to more frequently choose assets allocations that secure equal payoffs across states of nature, and this is particularly true for a relative asset price close to one (i.e., non-extreme sloped budget constraints). Thus, matched subjects appear to choose the safe bundle more frequently, which is an indication of increased risk aversion relative to circadian mismatched subjects.
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Our final approach to the data involves calculating certainty equivalents for the matched and mismatched subject groups as a way of evaluating whether one group is more or less risk averse than the other. The use of certainty equivalents is a nonparametric approach to answer this question. The certainty equivalent for a particular risky lottery is estimated as the highest payoff "safe bundle" (i.e., equal payoffs across states) that a subject would prefer to the nonequal payoff "risky" lottery. We start with a subject's actual 50 choices, correcting any GARP violation(s) with the CCEI measure for that subject. We then consider a variety a risky asset bundles, and for each one we search for the certainty equivalent as stated above. We restrict the search to those safe asset bundles that would not violate GARP if they were included. In other words, we find the highest certain payoff safe bundle such that there is a price at which the uncertain lottery is affordable but the safe bundle would not violate GARP and is consistent with the other 50 observations in the subject's data.
The results from calculating these certainty equivalents are shown in Figure 3 . The average certainty equivalent (CE) for matched and mismatched subjects are calculated for each asset bundle, and Fig. 3 shows the difference of these CEs between matched and mismatched subjects. The general path of where the data on these differences lie is along the range of available lotteries seen in the experiment. However, it is clear from these data, that mismatched individuals have higher calculated certainty equivalents than matched individuals for extreme lotteries that are far from the sure payoff lottery. This leads to our second result:
RESULT 2: Cognitive resource depletion via circadian mismatch leads to higher certainty equivalents (i.e., less risk aversion). Do these differences in risky choice result in payoff differences? In our experiments, subjects are paid based on one randomly chosen trial, and so it is more appropriate to examine expected payoff differences given a subject's 50 trails of risky choices. Table 6 presents quantile regressions that examine the effect of circadian match on expected payoffs at each decile of the distribution. Mean expected payoffs are actually lower for circadian matched subjects, however, the results are not statistically significant. We find no evidence that the increased tendency of circadian mismatched subjects to take risk or the tendency to have less price responsiveness benefits or harms payoff outcomes.
In sum, while the emerging literature found that individuals with lower levels of permanent cognitive abilities are less willing to take risk, we find that our sleepiness manipulation leads to lower risk aversion as measured by certainty equivalent. This result is consistent with other literature examining extreme forms of temporary cognitive resource depletion effects on incentivized risky choice tasks, such as total sleep deprivation (e.g., McKenna et al., 2007) or intoxication (e.g., Lane et al., 2004) . Importantly, despite the shift in risk attitude we do not find any significant difference in decision-making rationality resulting from circadian mismatch, under several alternative definitions of consistency.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigate how a particular form of cognitive resource depletion impacts choice consistency and outcomes in a risky choice task. The task (Choi et al., 2010) allows us to evaluate choice consistency with respect to several different measures of rationality. As a result, our contribution is that we are able to establish whether differences in preferences over risky asset bundles are the result of "irrationality", or whether they are the result of state-dependent preferences. The circadian mismatch protocol we implement to manipulate cognition is not only effective but externally valid and similar to what decision makers face in field environments. While much of the recent literature has focused on how permanent cognitive levels may correlate with risk preferences, we address a distinct concern that may help shed light on how temporary fluctuations in available cognitive resources may affect choice, independent of permanent abilities.
Our results are significant and reveal evidence that randomly assigned circadian mismatch subjects are no less rational than matched subjects, and yet preferences for risk shift.
Specifically, we have shown that choices are no less consistent with GARP, EU, or NEU theories as a result of the subject being circadian mismatched. And yet, these mismatched subjects are more willing to accept risky asset bundles compared to matched subjects.
This is an important result with practical and policy implications, especially if one considers that many real-world decision makers face even more serious bouts of sleepiness than the relatively mild manipulation we implement. In the realm of monetary risk choice, sleep deprivation is estimated to affect over 25% of workers in the financial and insurance industries (Centers for Disease Control report). In such industries, any increased tendency to take risk may have significant consequences. In other occupations, risky choice may not involve explicit monetary risk (e.g., air traffic controllers, long-haul trucking, medical practice, or emergency service workers), but sleepiness is commonplace and of great concern to policymakers establishing regulations that may involve prescribed rest or time-off to avoid sleep deprivation or limit shift work.
If one considers the other various forms of temporary cognitive challenges we often face (e.g., multi-tasking, stress, time pressure), this research may have even more significant implications. We leave it to future research to establish the relationship, if any, between various distinct forms of cognitive resource manipulations, or between cognition effects on monetary risk preference versus other choice domains. Nonetheless, it is clear that this area of research is fertile ground for studying choice in the real world where cognitive resources are not uniformly available at all times. 
TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1 Sample Stimulus
Figure 2a
Share of Assets in X for different log relative price (lrp) ratios-MATCHED subjects
Figure 2b
Share of Assets in X for different log relative price (lrp) ratios-MISMATCHED subjects 
, for all i,j,k,l}. The slack variable is the minimum adjustment necessary to the above program to satisfy Varian's (1988) expected utility test. The slack variable equals 0 if expected utility theory is satisfied. ++ The non expected utility test assumes that behavior is consistent with EU at all points except when assets are allocated as to secure constant income across states of the world and that probability of larger outcomes is underestimated and that of smaller outcomes is overestimated. 
APPENDIX
This appendix shows the complete derivation of the tests used in the paper. In the context of asset markets, Varian (1988) derives a set of linear inequalities that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a utility function that rationalizes individuals' choices. Consider an experimental subject whose preferences can be represented by a concave utility function over money . His problem is:
where is the demand of asset i in state k, is the probability that asset i pays in state k, is the price of asset i in state k, is the budget constraint in state k and is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the maximization problem. The first-order necessary conditions of an interior solution are: , 1,2; 1, … , These conditions and the concavity of imply that there numbers 0, 0, 1,2; 1, … , satisfying the following inequalities: Varian (1988) shows that the existence of numbers satisfying these inequalities is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a concave utility function over money that rationalizes a subject's decisions. In our experiment we have that π 1k = π 2k and m k = 1, k = 1,…,K. Choi et al. (200x) present evidence in favor of rational behavior, but contrary to expected utility theory. In their experiment, subjects chose asset allocation that guaranteed equal payoffs across states even when relative prices were different from one. Subjects in Choi et al.'s (200x) experiment behave as if they had a kink in the indifference curve at the 45° degree line. The authors show that disappointment aversion (Gul 1992 ) provides a better model of individual behavior. In our context disappointment aversion coincides with cumulative prospect theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) with convex weighting function (or simply underweighting of ½).
In our case, CPT and DA can be represented by a utility function that is linear in probabilities but that has a kink at the 45° degree line. For cumulative prospect theory we have that:
, 1 , 1 where is the probability weighting function. The marginal rate of substitution at is / 1 for the first equation and 1 / . In the case where 0.5, the expressions reduce to 0.5 / 1 0.5 and 1 0.5 / 0.5 . A subject with 0.5 0.5 will be less willing to trade-off assets than an expected utility maximize would. These subjects will have a preference for equal payoffs across states of the world. Similarly, for disappointment aversion we have that / 1 1 and / 1 1 for 1. These equations are identical to those of CPT (if 0.5 0.5) for 1 and 0.5. Note that CPT and DA both imply behavior consistent with GARP. Additionally, it implies consistency with expected utility for across budgets where choices imply provided probabilities are adjusted according to . For menus where , consistency with GARP above the 1 % percentile of this generated data we consider that the value of is too large for a given error rate and one particular trial. The value of in our study is set to 0.025. These tests/trials can be repeated many times to secure that they correspond to the randomness of the test. Table 2 presents results based on 100 trials per subject only. Table 2 summarizes the results of test of rational behavior. The first row presents the estimate of for the test of expected utility theory. Similar to the results of the GARP test, the test of expected utility theory finds no statistical significant differences in distance to rationality in the treatment and control (p-value = 0.658). The all-or-nothing nature of the consistency test might hide difference between the treatment and the control group. Table 2 presents the failure rate of the expected utility test under the assumption that subjects' decisions are measured with error. A failure rate of 1% test examines if the value of the slackness variable might be the product of a 1% deviation in decisions. 10 We find that the proportion of subjects failing the expected utility test with a measurement error of 1% is similar in the treatment and the control. As measurement error is increased, more subjects' decisions could be rationalized by expected utility theory. However, no difference in distance to expected utility is detected between the treatment and the control.
Failure to find differences in consistency of behavior might be due to the inability of these theories to completely characterize subjects' behavior. The last two rows in Table 2 present the estimated value of 0.5) for the test of cumulative prospect theory. This estimate can be also be used to estimate parameter 1 in disappointment aversion. Table 2 shows that alternatives to expected utility theory do not improve over it. The implicit probability weight is very close to 0.5. Table 2 also shows that the proportion of subjects for which 0.5 is not different across groups.
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In summary, we find that distant to rational behavior across treatment and control is similar regardless of the test of rational behavior we conduct. This is true despite the fact that behavioral changes are present in our experiment. , for all i,j,k,l}. The slack variable is the minimum adjustment necessary to the above program to satisfy Varian's (1988) expected utility test. The slack variable equals 0 if expected utility theory is satisfied.
10 A 1% error is added to the amount of the first asset purchased and the corresponding amount of the second asset is calculated using the budget constraint. If the so generated value of the first asset violates the budget constraint itself, the decisions are truncated. I need to check my code to confirm that the test has been run correctly. 11 Incidentally, we find that N of the 47 experimental subjects in Choi et al. facing similar incentives as in our experiment have an estimate of that is different from 0.5. * Failure rate (x%) is the proportion of subjects that fail the expected utility theory test under the assumption that asset demand is measured with an x% uniformly distributed error. ++ The non expected utility test assumes that behavior is consistent with EU at all points except when assets are allocated as to secure constant income across states of the world and that probability of larger outcomes is underestimated and that of smaller outcomes is overestimated.
